Securing your development environment starts with a simple habit. Treat every new repository as hostile until proven safe. I say that because recent reporting shows threat actors hiding commands in Visual Studio Code task configuration files to run malware on macOS machines. Jamf Threat Labs flagged a campaign that used fake GitHub and GitLab projects to trick developers into granting workspace trust and processing a malicious tasks.json file. Read the Computerworld write-up and Jamf’s threat blog for the technical details and indicators.
https://www.computerworld.com/article/4120099/jamf-has-a-warning-for-macos-vibe-coders.html https://www.jamf.com/jamf-threat-labs/
Recognise the concrete signs of compromise. A tasks.json file can contain a shell command entry that runs automatically if workspace trust is granted. Look for obvious red flags, for example commands containing curl, wget, bash, sh, powershell, node -e, or inline base64. A simple grep finds them: grep -R –line-number -E ‘”command”|”args”‘ .vscode || find . -name tasks.json -exec sed -n ‘1,120p’ {} \;. The malware reported by Jamf can execute arbitrary JavaScript, harvest system details and the public IP, and open persistence channels. Fake repositories are part of the bait. They often mimic real projects, include plausible README files and dependency lists, and rely on the developer trusting the repo author. Trust prompts in Visual Studio Code exist for a reason. Do not accept them for unfamiliar code.
Hardening is straightforward and practical. First, make code review mandatory before you run anything from an external repo. Inspect .vscode/tasks.json, package.json scripts, Dockerfile and any CI templates. Treat package scripts that call curl or npm install from a URL as immediate red flags. Second, add automated security scans into your local and remote checks. Run npm audit or yarn audit for JavaScript dependencies. Use static analysers and SAST tools such as eslint-plugin-security, and run an open-source scanner like Trivy or Snyk against the repo before opening it in the editor. Third, limit network access for development machines. Use a local firewall or app-level blocker on macOS, such as the built-in pf rules or a policy tool like Little Snitch, to prevent unexpected outbound connections. Fourth, deploy endpoint protection on developer machines. Modern EDR products can block unsigned binaries, detect suspicious child processes and quarantine known malicious payloads. Finally, sandbox suspicious projects. Open unknown repositories inside a disposable VM, container or a dedicated non-critical device.
Change how you trust code. I train myself to treat workspace trust as a privilege, not a convenience. Keep a checklist: inspect tasks.json, check scripts, verify lockfiles, and confirm package sources. Use pinned dependency versions and commit lockfiles to prevent supply-chain surprises. If an AI assistant suggests packages or code snippets, read what it proposes. AI can fetch malicious packages into a project just as easily as a human can paste a curl line. Run new code under an account with minimal privileges and monitor network calls while it runs.
Concrete takeaways: never grant workspace trust to an unfamiliar repo; always inspect tasks.json and build scripts before opening a project; run automated scans and static checks locally; restrict outbound connections from your dev machine; open unknown projects in a sandbox. Follow those rules and you reduce the attack surface dramatically. I prefer hard, repeatable steps over hope. Start with the checklist, and make inspection a habit.
